Defining futures contracts as substitutes for associated cash transactions enables a discussion of the evolution of controls over contract nonperformance risk. These controls are incorporated into exchange methods for clearing contracts. Three clearing methods are discussed: direct, ringing and complete. The incidence and operation of each are described. Direct-clearing systems feature bilateral contracts with terms specified by the counterparties to the contract. Exchanges relying on direct clearing systems chiefly serve as mediators in trade disputes. Ringing is shown to facilitate contract offset by increasing the number of potential counterparties. Ringing settlements reduce counterparty credit risk by reducing the accumulation of dependencies as contracts are offset. Ringing settlements also lower the cost of maintaining open contract positions, chiefly by lowering the amount of required margin deposits. Exchanges employing ringing methods generally adopted a clearinghouse to handle payments. Complete clearing interposes the clearinghouse as counterparty to every contract. This measure ensures that contracts are fungible with respect to both the underlying commodity and counterparty risk. 
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I. Introduction
This paper studies innovations in futures contracting before 1926. Early that year the Chicago Board of Trade Clearing Corporation (BOTCC) began intermediating futures contracts. As more than 80 percent of US futures contracts traded at the Chicago Board of Trade, this step established complete clearing as the standard for clearing and settling derivatives contracts. In the hundred years preceding the BOTCC, clearing and settlement methods moved from bilaterally negotiated arrangements to practices, though now automated, very similar to those used today. This paper explores how contract terms evolved to conform to the ways they were cleared.
The paper uses a broad definition of futures contracting. The definition recognizes the force of contractual obligations in two distinct regions of the state space: contract performance and contract nonperformance. In performance states one counterparty, the short position, delivers the underlying asset to its counterparty, the long position. At delivery, the long position pays the short position according to contract terms. This portion of the definition conforms to the standard definition of a futures contract as an obligation between counterparties to make a future-dated exchange at a price determined at the contract's inception. The standard definition is insufficient in two senses. First, it omits the counterparty's choice not to perform the contract. This choice will be optimal to one side of the contract in nonperformance states. Rights to exercise such choices are usefully construed as nonperformance options. These options have value. Contract counterparties recognize that the cost of absolute performance assurances can exceed the value of trading benefits and act as For a recent example of the standard definition see Kolb (1991, p. 4) . In contrast see Edwards 1 (1984, p. 225) who takes a position consistent with that taken here stating that the clearinghouse "transforms what would otherwise be forward contracts into highly liquid futures contracts." 2 barriers to trade. Mutual provision of nonperformance options substitute for absolute performance assurances overcoming these barriers to enable realization of trading benefits. Second, the standard futures definition obscures institutional incentives to innovate contract design. These incentives stem from needs to reduce credit-risk exposures by reducing probabilities for nonperformance states and mitigating loss amounts when nonperformance occurs. Further, the paper develops connections between losssharing arrangements and innovations in contract terms. Exchanges adopting complete clearinghouses internalize nonperformance losses increasing their incentives to innovate in ways that reduce these exposures.
Definitions of futures contracts that omit the nonperformance option are common. Emery (1896, p. 46 ) defines a futures contract "as a contract for the future delivery of some commodity, without reference to specific lots, made under rules of some commercial body, in a set form, by which the conditions as to the unit of amount, the quality, and the time of delivery are stereotyped, and only the determination of the total amount and the price is left open to the contracting parties." This definition is typical in that it defines futures contracting based on contractual details. I define futures con-1 tracts as enforceable substitutes for transactions in cash commodities or assets.
The definition serves two purposes. First, it broadens the category of contracts called futures. Williams (1982) , for example, argues that contracts traded at the Buffalo Board of Trade during the 1840s might be classed as futures because their terms were See Williams (1980, p. 140-145) for a discussion of early margin rules. Hill (1990) reviews the 2 literature on grade standards. 3 similar to those later adopted by the Chicago exchanges. The success of the Buffalo contracts developed from shared commercial interests in lessening nonperformance costs. Chicago merchants, having similar interests, adopted similar contract terms.
Both the New York merchants and the Chicago exchange members faced the potential for nonperformance loss and responded by adapting their contract terms to control loss exposures. For purposes of this paper, the relevant commonality is the economic interest to limit losses.
The second purpose served by this definition follows from the first. Many futures contract terms are best understood as efforts to minimize nonperformance costs subject to available loss-sharing arrangements. The specific measures adopted to control losses are determined by the extant legal environment. Contracts traded at the Buffalo Board of Trade rapidly developed use of performance bonds (margins) and delivery standards. However, enforcing contract performance beyond this point proved costly. 2 Subsequent changes in commercial law enabled the Chicago exchanges to surpass the Buffalo precedent, ultimately offering performance guarantees. In this sense, the contracts traded at the Buffalo exchange served the same commercial purposes as the futures contracts exchanged in Chicago. Differences in contract details stem more from differences in legal environment than to more fundamental differences in economic purpose.
Nonperformance issues are often ignored because failures are infrequent. An I use the term "give up" to demonstrate the functional equivalence between present usage of the 3 term "give up" and the relationship between clearing members and their associated nonmember firms. In present usage, a "give up" occurs when a thinly capitalized FCM noted for good order execution is engaged to handle a large order. The FCM's thin capitalization prevents him from taking the order. Under a give-up arrangement, he executes the order, then gives it up to a better capitalized member.
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understanding of the economic principles determining success is useful. This paper follows Coase (1937) in arguing that the record of successfully managed nonperformance risk is largely due to the internalization of information and incentives obtained when exchange-affiliated clearinghouses guarantee performance.
II. A modern context for understanding clearinghouse operations
A general description of modern clearing and settlement operations puts the early procedures into a meaningful context. Clearing is the process of reconciling and resolving obligations between counterparties. This section develops clearing and settlement in two subsections. First, clearing is examined absent consideration of nonperformance. Second, the problem of nonperformance is further developed. The practice of using offsets rather than cash settlements dates to banking practice in early 4 Florence. See Lane and Mueller (1985, p. 81) .
Marks are determined by settlement committees that generally follow the rules outlined here. In 5 exceptional circumstances, these committees can determine marks by substituting their assessed valuations for market-determined prices.
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services offered by banks, the nonmember "gives up" contracts to its clearing member who clears the contract through its clearing arrangements and then adjusts the nonmember's accounts.
Registration at a central clearinghouse enables offsetting, the second stage in the clearing process. Aggregation of the related transactions of each clearinghouse member identifies offsetting commitments. Offset occurs when the aggregated claims against any member are netted against the aggregate of the member's claims against all other members. The current liabilities of the clearinghouse and its members are the net of these obligations. Thus, clearing reduces the number of liabilities by relying on the fungibility of individual contracts.
In the third step, contract settlement extinguishes the current payment liabilities of contract counterparties. In bank clearinghouses, settlement occurs when member accounts are adjusted to reflect amounts paid. On payment, the obligations of all parties are satisfied. In futures markets, outstanding contracts are settled periodically by 4 marking them to market. Generally, marks are either the most recent market-determined price for each contract or, at the contract's termination, the cash-market price of the underlying asset. All outstanding contracts are marked to the settlement price. As 5 contracts are marked to market, payments are determined by the netted obligations.
Increases in settlement prices produce gains for long positions and losses for short FTC (1920) , Volume I, p. 113. Like bank clearings, settlements set currently payable amounts between counterparties to zero. Unlike the operations of bank clearinghouses, cleared futures contracts generally remain outstanding following a settlement. This means that credit risk, the risk that one counterparty will fail to meet its obligations, is not extinguished; periodic settlement reduces this risk to the uncollateralized portion of the price change realized at the next settlement.
B. Nonperformance problems
The nonperformance problem is well illustrated by the experience of several Peoria, Illinois grain elevators offering forward contracts to local farmers. Quoting from the Federal Trade Commission's Report on the Grain Trade:
Contracting for grain at a fixed price has proven an unsatisfactory practice with many elevators. The principle objection thereto is that if prices are in advance of those stipulated in the contract when the time of delivery arrives the farmer becomes dissatisfied and often refuses to fulfill the contract. If the elevator then attempts to enforce it the usual result is that the farmer transfers his business to another elevator. His dissatisfaction easily spreads to other farmers, especially if the elevator in question is an independent or one of a line company and may result in serious loss of business.
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Forward contracting is motivated by expectations of benefits. In the Peoria case, the beneficiaries are farmers and grain elevators. Irrespective of motivations to contract forward, subsequent performance is conditional on prices realized at delivery dates. In This is the incompleteness referred to in Kane (1980) . 7 7 some states, counterparties find nonperformance is preferred to losses realized by fulfilling contract terms. Recognizing this, counterparties have incentives to restrict their nonperformance opportunities. Doing so improves their access to benefits from contracting forward. Along similar lines, Smith and Warner (1979) show how bond covenants lower debt costs by lessening the default risk of corporation-issued bonds.
These restrictions lessen both the likelihood of nonperformance and the extent of losses should nonperformance become unavoidable. However, modifications assuring contract performance are costly. When these costs exceed benefits derived from further performance assurances, it becomes optimal for counterparties to exchange nonperformance options.
7 Edwards (1984) distinguishes between bank and futures clearinghouses. Bank clearinghouses settle by netting payments between members, collecting payments, then crediting or debiting member accounts. They are obligated only to the extent of a member's account balance. Futures clearinghouses guarantee performance of cleared contracts. They extinguish current liabilities and take steps to lessen exposure to future defaults, but performance guarantees imply that some residual exposure remains.
The contention of this paper is that the evolution of clearing arrangements was importantly influenced by the needs of members to control their risk of losses from nonperformance. Thus, exchange policy on contract details like margin and marking contracts to market stems from its interest in the clearing mechanism.
III. The evolution of contracts and clearing systems 8 Three clearing methods developed before formation of the BOTCC. These are clearing by direct settlement, clearing through rings, and complete clearing. The section describes the methods, identifies certain credit risk problems and the contract specifications adopted to address these problems.
A. Direct Settlement
Direct settlement is a bilateral reconciliation of contractual commitments obtained through delivery or by offset between original counterparties. For example, A contracts with B to sell 5,000 bushels of wheat in May at $1.00 per bushel. There are three categories of possible outcomes for a direct settlement system. First, the specified terms of the contract can be performed. Thus, the contract is settled when A delivers 5,000 bushels of wheat to B in May and B pays $5,000 to A. This is settlement by direct delivery. Second, parties can settle the contract before May by agreeing to a price at which both are willing to extinguish the liabilities of the other. This is called direct offset.
The previous example is extended to illustrate direct offset. Let A and B agree to a second contract in March as follows: B commits to deliver 5,000 bushels in May to A and A commits to pay B $0.95 per bushel, or $4,750. The two contracts could be settled in May as follows: Fulfilling the initial contract A delivers 5,000 bushels to B and B pays A $5,000. The second contract requires that B deliver 5,000 bushels to A and A pay B $4,750. Because wheat deliveries cancel, the net from settling both contracts is a $250 payment by B to A. Alternately, both parties benefit by recognizing in March that the earlier contract has been offset on payment by B of $250. This is called a pay- Forrester (1931) says the rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association required payment of interest on 8 profits. As of 1882, the General Rules of the New York Produce Exchange also specified payment of interest on profits. 9 ment of the difference. Both A and B benefit by offsetting because each avoids titletransfer costs and reduces recording-keeping expenses.
It might be objected that the present value of $250 paid in March is greater than $250 paid in May, thus B would refuse to settle on these terms. However, recall that the price for the March settlement is mutually agreeable. B agrees to settle early provided the difference amount paid in March is less than the price change expected to be realized in May. A is willing to take an amount smaller than her expected price change because the payment amount can be invested. Thus, a mutually agreeable settlement price in March can be based on the present value of a settlement occurring in May.
Alternately, B could be compensated by a payment of interest from A on the profit realized by A in March. Some exchanges required interest payments on profits. Both ap-8 proaches are equivalent provided the rate used to calculate interest payments equals the market rate over the same term for equal-risk investments.
As a last outcome, one party can fail to perform leaving contract settlement to standing enforcement procedures. As this contract is described, nonperformance can only occur in May. Before May, neither party has a duty to perform. Accurate inferences might be made about counterparty ability to perform; nevertheless, until a contract term goes unperformed, the contract stands. This aspect of the contract elevates risk in two ways. First, the possibility of accumulating substantial losses increases as time remaining in the contract increases. Second, a failing counterparty has incentives Nevin and Davis (1970, p. 17-19) suggest that assignability of contracts developed much earlier. Thus, it would not be surprising to find similar contracts trading well before 1733.
For similar instances, see Powell's (1984) description of the development of arbitration in England. 10 Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) describe earlier developments.
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to gamble in hopes of resurrecting net worth. Such gambling increases credit risk.
Recognizing these risk sources motivates adoption of contract terms that impose periodic demonstrations of continued performance capability. Including these provisions curtails loss buildups and reduces incentives to gamble for resurrection.
Direct settlement is the oldest clearing arrangement. Emery (1896, p. 35-36) describes trading in the warrants of the East India Company in 1733. These were bearer instruments transferring title to a warehouse receipt for a quantity of metal on a future date. Endorsement signified sale of the warrant. Thus, transfers were directly settled at the time of sale. The earliest of these warrants were for specific lots of a metal, later "general warrants" transferred title for specified quantities and grades.
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These warrants did not trade on exchanges. Thus, resolution of legal disputes arising from trading in warrants was obtained in courts. This proved costly. Obtaining a less costly route to handle trade disputes served as an impetus for the formation of exchanges and trading associations. Most often exchange membership bound mem-10 bers to accept the arbitration decisions made by an appointed committee. Ellison (1905, p. 15) records that trading in Liverpool began shortly after 1781.
Indications are that contracts were directly settled in the early years of that exchange.
Ellison describes the market before 1860 as follows: "The merchant sold his cotton through a selling broker; the spinner purchased it through a buying broker. There were Ellison (1905, p. 244) .
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brokers who bought and sold, but they were an exception to the rule, and comparatively few in number." The Liverpool Association actively sought to improve contract perfor-11 mance. The earliest measures left contract negotiation to counterparties, the exchange intervening only to arbitrate disputes. Negotiations could be complex. Ellison describes a 1825 transaction involving the placement of "two letters of credit of $50,000 each" on a contract for 6,000 bales of cotton estimated to be worth $500,000.
The effectiveness of Liverpool clearing methods is shown by rule changes adopted at that exchange. Ellison (1905, p. 292-295 ) describes settlement problems as "numerous disputes arising out of the gigantic speculative transactions developed by the occurrences incidental to the American [Civil] War." Dumbell (1927, p. 196) says that "the confusion of the war years forced the Association to prescribe for itself a constitution and a gradually increasing number of rules and bye-laws." Williams (1982, p. 306, fn. 2) describes a vote on the adoption of Association rules on June 17, 1864. Ellison (1905, p. 325-326) states that lack of grade standards created bargaining situations that contributed to contract-settlement problems: "At other times the importer would discover that his property had been sold 'short', in which case he would refuse to part with it except at a smart premium on current prices." These comments suggest that direct settlement of individually arranged contract terms used in the earlier years proved unwieldy in the volatile markets of the 1860s. The members of the Association responded by standardizing contract terms, particularly grade standards, to increase contract fungibility. For transfers of the underlying commodity, contracts became close Williams (1982, p. 315 ) and see Williams (1986, p. 125) . The Buffalo Association adopted measures to ensure performance. Contracts were most often settled by payment of differences rather than delivery. Contract offsets were obtained via bilateral negotiation because "individual traders were themselves adept at enforcing the terms of contracts and keeping them comparable to others ... "
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Contract offset was helped by standardizing deliverable grain by stipulating sources of deliverable grain or flour. Market participants understood the quality implied by these locations, enabling them to substitute contracts for one another; i.e., contracts were made fungible.
The measures proved effective. Williams (1982, p. 313) quotes Buffalo newspaper descriptions of that market's response to late-Spring ice on the Great Lakes. The Weiner (1991) attributes the decline of petroleum futures to the development of the Standard Oil Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) show that investment of nonzero carryover amounts affects the price of a futures contract.
The preference is weak because at a profit of .04 from direct settlement C is indifferent. call that a direct settlement system requires that both counterparties be willing to offset.
To obtain a direct settlement, C might find it necessary to give up part of the .04 profit per unit to obtain an offset of the contract with B. A ring settlement enables C to avoid this bargaining problem, establishing a weak preference for settling through the ring compared with a direct settlement.
22
The interests of counterparty B in the contract with C deserve special attention. The customer was held bound by this similar transaction on the part of his commission merchant; because, in employing the merchant, the customer was taken as intending that the business should be done according to the custom or usage of that market, whether or not he knew of such custom or usage.
Thus, counterparty C could offset an original contract with B assured that the liability was terminated. The decision established that finality was independent of whether counterparties were original or not. As ringing benefitted customers by easing contract trading, these customers could not invalidate their contracts when ringing resulted in losses.
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To facilitate ring settlements, exchanges adopted centralized mechanisms for Nevin and Davis (1970, p. 6) indicate that similar clearing systems were employed by the French in 27 the 13th century. Merchandise was bought and sold at fairs with transactions debited or credited accordingly by an on-the-spot banker. At the close of the fair, all transactions were cleared with settlement made in a single payment as needed between the banker and each merchant.
A case described by Parker (1911) suggests that demand for clearing services can be substantial.
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The membership of a German exchange in 1908 sought to avoid government regulation by moving the membership to another building and dropping its clearing house arrangements. Soon after, a private firm offered to clear settlements for those who chose to patronize it.
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payments and deliveries. These arrangements performed like bank clearinghouses.
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A counterparty entering a ring with contract losses submitted a record of their offset contracts along with a suitable draft to the clearing facility. Offset contracts were confirmed by matching against the offset contracts submitted by other ring members. The clearing facility credited member accounts in the amount of drafts received and debited accounts on disbursing payments to counterparties realizing gains. Deliveries were cleared by passing warehouse receipts to the clearing facility. The receipts were then passed to parties taking delivery. Members were charged fees for contracts settled through the clearing facility. That part of the regulation referring to the financial standing of a correspondent should be understood to mean that the principal should keep himself well informed, as business transactions between the two would warrant, as to the financial condition of his correspondent, so as to protect himself and the trade in general against any losses which might occur through the correspondent becoming insolvent.
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This was generally understood as illustrated in a letter by T.P. Newcomer describing his position with the CBOT. Newcomer wrote: "We understand your Board is not a collecting agency and do not expect you to get us our money..." Thus, counterparties re-30 tained responsibility for monitoring the financial condition of counterparties and to collect from them any payments due. The exchange did not take on this responsibility.
The exchanges did provide members with routes for controlling nonperformance risk. The first of these was margin. Like direct-settlement clearing systems, exchange rules enabled counterparties to call for margin. Two forms of margin deposit could be required of contract counterparties. The first, original margin, was generally limited to no more than ten per cent of the value of the contract at its most recent futures price.
This established an upper limit on the liquid assets that an exchange member could be required to maintain. The limit curtailed calls for excessive amounts of margin to force a counterparty into default. Margin amounts were reciprocal; members calling for mar-
The CBOT attitude toward margin determination is expressed in a letter from a special committee 31 which considered exchange-determined margin: "mandatory rules are impossible and that anything else would operate simply in the nature of a suggestion and would not only be unenforceable but ill-advised, because of the fact that each member of this exchange governs his transactions with his customers by his own ideas of credits." BOD 9-17-1912.
Bisbee and Simonds, p. 150. Common law also provided a right to call for margin. Under common 32 law, a reasonable period had to be provided to meet the margin requirement before the contract could be regarded in default.
Determinating securities allowable for margin purposes was left to the counterparties. The CBOT adopted a one-hour rule in 1887. It required members to meet calls for margin within 34 one banking hour. Prior to that date three banking hours were allowed.
See Bisbee and Simonds (1886, p. 182-183 Failure to make a required margin deposit was a contract default. Margin rules enabled members to determine financial ability by calling counterparties for margin.
Failure to post the margin was nonperformance, enabling members to curtail the accumulation of further losses and prevent gambles to resurrect net worth.
Rules requiring margin deposits were also facilitated by the clearinghouse. The ability to offset contracts and, by that, substitute counterparties required notification rules. The clearinghouse kept track of contract counterparties, enabling their identification. However, because principals often confidentiality, commission merchants obligated themselves to fulfill contract terms. Thus, exchange rules generally regulated 35 calls for margin between commission merchants and not their customers, the actual principals. The commission merchants, in turn, arranged for margin deposits from actual principals. Margin called from actual principals who were not members of the exchange were not subject to exchange limits on margin requirements.
Periodic contract settlement, today called marking to market, was not generally adopted by the exchanges. An exception was the Liverpool Cotton Association.
Quoted from Andreas (1894), Volume III, p. 351. The following communication illustrates a typical 36 settlement between counterparties. "We beg to advise you that a private settlement has been arranged on the Sept. Barley on which we yesterday reported default. This settlement is satisfactory to all parties concerned; consequently we ask that our request for the appointment of a Committee to determine a settlement price be withdrawn." BOD meeting 10-7-1919.
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Ellison (1905, p. 354-356) suggests that periodic settlements were adopted by that exchange in 1883 because of heavy broker losses incurred during a corner. Forrester (1931, p. 196-207) states: "Liverpool has weekly settlements; all outstanding contracts are reduced to a weekly settlement price and all differences must be cleared." Liverpool's periodic settlement adoption followed that of the London Stock Exchange. Forrester (1931, p. 196-207) says the motivation for both organizations was the same: "to prevent plungers without capital and unduly optimistic speculators from proceeding so far as to hurt the market before a check is applied." Periodic settlement curtailed nonperformance losses in two ways. First, it lessened the probability of incurring a loss by imposing repeated demonstrations of financial ability to perform. Second, it curtailed loss accumulations.
Standards for the financial integrity of exchange members give another route for controlling nonperformance risk. The CBOT took early steps to lessen credit risk by regulating membership based on financial ability. On March 27, 1863, its membership adopted a rule stating Any member of the association making contracts either written or verbal, and failing to comply with the terms of such contract, shall, upon representation of an aggrieved member to the Board of Directors, accompanied by satisfactory evidence of the facts, be suspended by them from all privileges of membership in the association until such contract is equitably or satisfactorily arranged and settled.
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Thus, failure to comply with the terms of a contract could result in loss of a membership FTC II, p. 72. 37 Quoted from Andreas (1894), Volume III, p. 299.
38
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in the association, the value of this membership stemming from the right to trade contracts "on 'Change." The relevance of this rule was illustrated a year later during a debate over initiation fees: "The amount of initiation fee is not one of the questions taken into account when a man is proposed for membership. The character and standing of the applicant is the only matter for consideration."
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In 1873, the CBOT extended its efforts by making nonperformance of any contract, on or off the exchange, grounds for requiring a demonstration of financial ability.
The rule stated:
Any member of this Association who fails to comply with and meet any business obligation or contract, may, on complaint of any member of this Association, be required to make an exhibit of his financial condition on oath to the Directory of this Board, which shall be open to any aggrieved member; and should such member, failing as aforesaid, refuse to make such statement, he shall be expelled from the Association. Arrangements for payments from counterparties ranged from banking arrangements to handle payments to adoption of a clearinghouse within the association. The CBOT developed a clearinghouse for handling difference payments in 1883.
Describing the forthcoming clearinghouse the CBOT Annual Report said it "meets a want which has long been felt by the trade." A contemporary described its operations saying "It takes no cognizance of the transactions on the board, but simply plays the part of a common fund, to which each member pays the excess of his daily debit over his daily credits, or receives the excess in case the later aggregate be greater than the 
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The following table adds the clearinghouse as counterparty to the contracts used to illustrate the ringing system. Under the system the tying up of large sums of money in margins, in event that a long or short on the other end refuses to 'ring out,' is avoided. Thus, an evil which tends to concentrate future trading into the hands of the stronger firms is eliminated.
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At times, exchange members avoided the cost of carrying these balances by simply not conforming to rules requiring quick responses to calls for margin. The following 1920 complaint from the Rogers Grain Co. to the Board of Directors of the CBOT illustrates:
This rule has practically become a dead letter with many. Very few members put up margins until after the close even though they are called at Nine O'clock in the morning, while the rules provide that margins shall be put up and evidence is submitted of same within one hour,...
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This response reduced the cost of carrying margin balances, but increased nonperformance risk and, notably, further elevated margin requirements to safeguard against this risk.
Emery (1896) To replace the collateral security which might theoretically be required, but in fact is not, there has been set up at some of the exchanges a bureau of settlement (Caisse de Liquidation) in the form of an independent corporation. Such bureaus are attached to the exchanges at Havre, Lille, and Roubaix, as well as the sugar exchange at Paris.
When a contract is entered into, the function of the bureau of settlement is to substitute for the original contract between buyer and seller, two new and distinct contracts--one between the bureau as buyer and the original seller, and the other between the buyer and the bureau as seller. As a result of this operation, the individual buyers and sellers have no direct relations with one another, but each has a contract with the bureau.
In the United States, officials of the New York Coffee exchange proposed to copy the clearing system used in the European coffee exchanges. The adoption of Rule VI in 1891 implemented its complete clearinghouse: Section 1. All transactions made in grain during the day shall be cleared through the clearing association, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties to the transaction. Upon acceptance by the manager of such transactions, the clearing association assumes the position of buyer to the seller and seller to the buyer in respect to such transactions and the last settling price shall be considered as the contract price.
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The operation of the Association's clearinghouse is described as follows:
Most of the larger firms own memberships in it and it has been found to be almost a vital necessity to the trade. Certainly it insures less friction than the old way of trading and also facilitates business generally. When the trades are checked at the close of the session the member gives a check to the clearing house for margins or in case the market has fluctuated in favor of their customers they receive a check. It does away with a great deal of trouble. To settle with the clearing house at a certain time every day is a far different matter than calling each other for margins.
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Rule VII provided the Chamber of Commerce with the right to control its exposure to nonperformance risk by requiring margins. The rule states: Section 1. The manager of this Association may call from purchasers below the market and from sellers above the market such reasonable margins as in his judgement may be necessary for the protection of the association. Such margins to be placed to the credit of the party paying the same and to be retained by the manager, in whole or in part, as he may deem necessary until the trades for which such margins have been paid have been settled. 
D. Evolution of clearing systems
This section summarizes the three methods of clearing. Markets employing these methods have certain commonalities. Each market sought to increase the ability of members to obtain contract offset. This ability increased the benefits that could be derived from transacting in benchmark commodities rather than making similar but more costly transactions in the actual commodities.
Participants in direct settlement markets were able to offset contracts provided they could be assured of counterparty performance. The rules developed by markets positions. The memberships of these acted in a manner consistent with Smith and Warner (1979) ; that is, by binding themselves to externally determined rules they achieved lower rates of contract default and lower costs of operation.
V. Summary
Futures contracts are defined as substitutes for associated cash transactions.
This definition enables a discussion of the evolution of controls over nonperformance risk. Three clearing methods are discussed: direct, ringing and complete. The incidence and operation of each is described. Direct clearing systems feature bilateral contracts with terms specified by the counterparties to the contract. Exchanges relying on direct clearing systems serve chiefly as mediators in trade disputes. Ringing is shown to facilitate contract offset by increasing the number of potential counterparties.
Increased ability to obtain contract offset is valuable because counterparties can Participants of the loss-sharing arrangement will substitute rules for pricing up to the point where the marginal value of risk reduction obtained from rules equals the marginal benefit from compensation.
